American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service: The Inapplicability of Section 301 "In Aid of Arbitration" Injunctions to Violations of Public Rights by Markakis, Anastasia N.
CASE COMMENTS
American Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Service: The Inapplicability of Section 301
"In Aid of Arbitration" Injunctions to Violations
of Public Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
In American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,'
the District Court for the District of Connecticut was presented with
the unprecedented issue of whether to grant an injunction to protect
employees' first amendment right of free speech 2 pending arbitration
of a labor dispute.3 In determining that injunctive relief was proper,
the district court applied the stringent standard that had developed
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act4 (section
301). Under this standard, injunctive relief is granted when (1) the
traditional equitable requirements for issuance of injunctive relief are
satisfied,5 and (2) the injunction is "in aid of arbitration. '6
1. 595 F. Supp. 403 (D. Conn. 1984), affd on reconsideration, 595 F. Supp. 409 (D.
Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1262 (1986).
The district court granted the defendant's motion for reconsideration. On reconsideration,
the court denied the defendant's motion for a stay. The Second Circuit reversed the lower
court decision by denying injunctive relief. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
2. See U.S. Const. amend. I. The first amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
3. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp. 403,
406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
Section 301 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and 2 labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to citizenship of the parties.
5. The traditional equity test for determining the propriety of issuing injunctive relief
is a finding of:
a) irreparable harm and
b) either 1) likelihood of success on the merits or
2) sufficiently serious question going to the merits to make them fair
ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly
toward the plaintiffs.
Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979).
6. The phrase "in aid of arbitration" refers to a situation whereby a court will issue
an injunction to preserve the arbitration process and ensure an effective remedy to an
arbitrator. The phrase is not uniformly used by courts to describe this section 301 standard.
However, it will be used in this Article to describe the section 301 prerequisite because
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In American Postal Workers, Philip Danko, the president of the New
London Connecticut Area Local of the American Postal Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, was informed of his imminent discharge on the grounds of
disloyalty to his employer, the United States Postal Service 7 (hereinafter
Postal Service).8 The alleged disloyal conduct was the mailing of a letter
to a postal customer stating that mail service was being delayed due
to the Postal Service's elimination of fourteen positions at the New
London Post Office.9 Danko and the union commenced grievance and
arbitration proceedings pursuant to the provisions of their collective
bargaining agreement. 0 Prior to completing these proceedings, however,
Danko and the union filed a motion in district court seeking a preliminary
injunction to restrain the Postal Service from terminating Danko's em-
ployment pending arbitration of the dispute." The plaintiffs argued that
an injunction was necessary to avoid the irreparable harm 2 that would
it was used by both the district court and the court of appeals in American Postal
Workers. "Frustration of arbitration" will also be used to describe the circumstances in
which a section 301 injunction will be granted. In other words, if the court finds that
without an injunction there would be a frustration of arbitration, then a section 301
injunction will be issued. Some courts have been creative and described the circumstances
when a section 301 injunction will be granted as (1) a showing that arbitration would be
but "a futile endeavor," Amalgamated Transit Union Division 1384 v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1976); or (2) a showing that arbitration would be
a "hollow formality," Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local
217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. The United States Postal Service is a governmental corporation established as an
"independent unit of the executive branch of the United States." Postal Reorganization
Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (1970).
8. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp. 403,
406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1986).
9. The letter stated in pertinent part:
The purpose of this letter is to make you aware of the fact that large amounts of
your film mailers are not being processed for outgoing dispatch or incoming delivery.
This situation has been going on for some time now. Postal management will not
make you aware of this, in fact, they would most likely deny it if questioned about
it.
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 716 F.2d 715, 718 (2d
Cir. 1985).
10. Two of the four steps of the grievance and arbitration process had been completed
by the date of filing the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint
was filed three days before the effective date of discharge. American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp. 403, 406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd.
766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
11. Id. at 405-06. Defendant raised the issue that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust
their contractual remedies. The court rejected the defendant's argument stating "defendant's
position is that while a court may enforce an arbitration award, a court has no power to
maintain the status quo pending the results of arbitration. However, neither the case law
nor the Congressionally-established policy favoring arbitration as the means of resolving
labor disputes requires this result." Id. at 409 (on reconsideration), rev'd on other grounds.
766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
12. Irreparable injury has been defined as "injury for which a monetary award cannot
"IN AID OF ARBITRATION" INJUNCTIONS
result from Danko's discliarge. The alleged harm was the possible chilling
effect on the exercise of the employees' first amendment right to free
speech resulting from a fear of employer retaliation.'
3
The action was brought under section 1208(b) of the 1970 Postal
Reorganization Act.' 4 However, the parties agreed to apply, by analogy,
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 5 The district
court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the
equitable requirements for injunctive relief' 6 and the section 301 "in
aid of arbitration" prerequisite were satisfied.17 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court when it failed to find
either irreparable harm or "frustration of arbitration." 8
be adequate compensation." Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d
70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979).
13. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
14. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1970). The statute
provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between the Postal Service and a labor
organization representing Postal Service employees, or between any such labor organizations,
may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy." It is unclear under what statutory
basis the plaintiffs ultimately obtained jurisdiction. On reconsideration, the district court
judge stated:
As an initial matter, 39 U.S.C. 1208(b) appears to vest jurisdiction in this court.
Defendant argues, however, that the body of case law applicable to section 1208(b)
precludes the exercise of jurisdiction. The parties agree tha the law developed
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185,
applies by analogy (emphasis added).
This cursory and unsatisfactory discussion leaves the reader confpsed as to the statutory
basis upon which the plaintiffs finally obtained jurisdiction, and why the parties felt
compelled to stipulate to the use of section 301 analysis. See infra note 15.
15. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 409 (D. Conn. 1984) (on reconsideration), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985). This
case may prove to be of little precedential value because (1) the anti-injunction provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act do not apply to federal employees, United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); and (2) the Postal Reorganization Act contains no
anti-injunction provisions. Furthermore, courts have routinely granted injunctive relief in
disputes brought under the Postal Reorganization Act by applying traditional equitable
standards. See, e.g., Owen v. Mulligan, 640 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1981); United Parcel
Service v. United States Postal Service, 615 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, the appro-
priateness of applying, by analogy, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
is highly questionable. However, it should be noted that the cases cited above did not
involve a collective bargaining agreement mandating arbitration of all disputes. Regardless
of whether this analysis was properly applied to the facts of American Postal Workers,
the case is highly relevant to situations in which the section 301 analysis legitimately
applies.
16. See supra note 5 for equitable requirements for injunctive relief.
17. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
18. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 766 F.2d 715,
723 (2d Cir. 1985). See supra note 6 for a definition of "frustration of arbitration."
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The plaintiffs in American Postal Workers improperly pled their
motion for injunctive relief under section 301. They sought injunctive
relief to protect their constitutional right to free speech under a labor
law provision that only protects private rights secured under collective
bargaining agreements. 9 The district court and the court of appeals, in
turn, erred in applying section 301 without recognizing or correcting
the plaintiffs' mistake. In an attempt to show the inappropriateness of
applying the section 301 analysis to American Postal Workers, this
Article will (1) review the development of section 301 injunctions and
the policies underlying the "in aid of arbitration" requirement, 20 (2)
examine the application of the section 301 standard to the facts of
American Postal Workers,2' (3) scrutinize the court's application of the
section 301 standard,22 and (4) explore the plaintiffs' alternative right
to injunctive relief under the Constitution.23
II. EMERGENCE OF SECTION 301 INJUNCTIONS IN LIGHT OF THE
ANTI-INJUNCTION PROVISIONS OF THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
A. Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge-Recognition of Section 301 In-
junctions Against Unions Striking Over Arbitrable Issues
Prior to 1932, federal judges liberally issued injunctions to enjoin
striking unions whenever they disapproved of the methods or goals of
the strikers. 24 In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act 25 to
curtail this practice and "bring some order out of the industrial chaos
that had developed. '2 6 The Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly prohibits the
federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes. 27 Thirty-eight
years later in the landmark decision Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retpil Clerks
Union, Local 770,28 the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the
19. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-80.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 81-97.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 98-121.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 122-61.
24. B. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 3-4 (1983).
25. 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982).
26. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
27. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1982). The preamble
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress Assembled, That no court of the United States, as herein
defined, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except
in a strict conformity with the provisions of this Act; nor shall any such restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy
declared in this Act.
28. 398 U.S. 235 (1970), overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195
(1962).
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anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.29
In Boys Markets, an employer and a union were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement that included both a no-strike provision and a
provision consigning all contractual disputes to arbitration.30 Irrespective
these provisions, the union went on strike alleging that the employer
had violated the collective bargaining agreement when it allowed non-
union workers to rearrange the frozen food section in the employer's
supermarket.31 The employer sought injunctive relief to enjoin the strike
and specific performance of the arbitration provision in the contract.
32
The Court was faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to enforce
the union's promise not to strike (and the parties' agreement to arbitrate)
by issuing an injunction or to follow the dictates of Norris-LaGuardia
and deny injunctive relief. To resolve this issue, the Court engaged in
a lengthy, historical discussion of the law and federal policy surrounding
the question of whether the federal judiciary should issue injunctive
relief in labor disputes. The Court concluded that although labor law
and public policy, in general, have substantially changed through the
years to reflect the dynamic character of American labor politics, the
law relating to federal court involvement in granting injunctive relief
in labor disputes has not been modified to reflect the new federal
policies.
The Court explained that a rigid application of Norris-LaGuardia in
1970 was inappropriate because the "Act was responsive to a situation
totally different from that which exists today. ' 34 Since 1932 when Norris-
LaGuardia was enacted, labor unions have grown and become more
powerful. As union strength has magnified, Congressional policy has
shifted from attempting to protect the unions to encouraging collective
bargaining and promoting the use of peaceful techniques for resolving
labor disputes.
35
The enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 1947 reflected
the new federal policy of encouraging peaceful settlement of labor
disputes through collective bargaining and the use of grievance and
arbitration procedures.36 Section 301(a) of the Act3 7 conferred subject-
29. Id. at 253-54.
30. Id. at 238-39.
31. Id. at 239.
32. Id. at 239-40.
33. Id. at 249-53.
34. Id. at 250.
35. Id..at 251.
36. This congressional policy is embodied in § 203(d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Labor Management Relations § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). The Act
provides in pertinent part, "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." See also
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
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matter jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear cases involving violations
of collective bargaining agreements.38 According to section 301(a), the
federal courts are permitted to hear cases involving a breach of a no-
strike clause or the violation of an arbitration provision.
Therefore, two conflicting statutes with differing policy considerations
had emerged: the Norris-LaGuardia Act, prohibiting injunctive relief in
labor disputes; and the Labor Management Relations Act, permitting
parties to a contract to seek enforcement of their agreement in federal
courts. The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile these seemingly
contradictory Congressional dictates in Boys Markets.39. The Court held
that the federal courts had the authority to issue injunctive relief in
limited situations when either (1) the collective bargaining agreement
contains a no-strike clause or (2) the strike involves a grievance that
the parties have agreed to arbitrate.40
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America,4' the
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether injunctive relief could be
granted to enjoin employees engaged in a sympathy strike.42 As in Boys
Markets, the employees in Buffalo Forge were bound by a no-strike
clause and a mandatory arbitration provision.4 3 However, the Court
denied injunctive relief because the underlying dispute was not "even
remotely subject to the arbitration provision of the contract." 44 In this
case, the Court drew a distinction between a strike based on an arbitrable
grievance and a sympathy strike not based on an arbitrable dispute. To
obtain a section 301 injunction, the union must be striking over an
arbitrable issue because the policy underlying section 301 injunctions
(1959) ("The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the
collective bargaining agreement."). See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How
ARBITATION WORKS 1-43 (1973).
37. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
38. See supra note 4 for the statutory language of section 301.
39. The Court explained:
The literal terms of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act must be accommodated to
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act and the purposes of arbitration. Statutory interpretation requires more than
concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the total
corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
40. Id. at 253-55. The rationale underlying the Court's holding was that "[tihe central
purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to foster the growth and vitality of labor organizations
is hardly retarded-if anything, this goal is advanced-by a remedial device that merely
enforces the obligation that the union freely undertook under a specifically enforceable
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration." Id. at 252-53.
41. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
42. A sympathy strike is "a strike in which employees (whether in a union or not)
who have no dispute with their employer, honor a union's picket line." B. FELDACKER,
LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAw 227 (2d ed. 1983).
43. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 399-400
(1976).
44. Id. at 407.
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is the enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate.4 Buffalo Forge
highlighted for the first time that (1) a dispute over an arbitrable issue
is necessary in seeking a section 301 injunction, and (2) preservation
of the arbitral process is an essential requirement for issuance of a
section 301 injunction.46
B. Recognition of Section 301 "Status Quo Injunctions" Against
Employers
Subsequent to the Boys Markets and Buffalo Forge decisions, unions
began to petition the courts for section 301 injunctions against employers
allegedly engaged in conduct violative of their collective bargaining
agreements and subject to mandatory arbitration provisions. 47 Applying
the policy of protecting the arbitration process underlying Boys Markets
and Buffalo Forge, federal courts extended the use of section 301
injunctions to enjoin employer conduct that would render the arbitral
decision a "futile endeavor. '48 Thus, many courts recognized that is-
suance of an injunction "in aid of arbitration" was a "two-sided coin. '49
Section 301 injunctions against employers are commonly referred to
as "status quo injunctions" 50 because they require the employer to
maintain the status quo pending arbitration of the dispute.5 1 Status quo
45. See id. 410-11.
46. Id. at 407-13.
47. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Teamsters Local Union No. 71
v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978); Bakery Drivers Local 802 v.
S.B. Thomas, Inc., 99 L.R.R.M. 2253 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Columbia Typographical Union
No. 101 v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2394 (D.D.C. 1978); Lever
Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th
Cir. 1976); Amalgammated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346
F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa. 1972), remanded without opinion, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972);
Technical, Office & Professional Workers Local 575 v. Budd Co., 345F. Supp. 42 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
48. Amalgamated Transit Union Division 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d
1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), reversed, 550
F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977) (Greyhound II).
49. Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d
115, 123 (4th Cir. 1976). (The court explained "[a]n injunction to preserve the status
quo pending arbitration may be issued either against a company or against a union in
an appropriate Boys Markets case..."). Another district court remarked, "It would be
ironic indeed if a Court could enjoin a strike under the principles of Boys Markets but
was powerless to prevent similar action of the employer in light of the strong labor
concerns that prompted the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." Columbia Typo-
graphical Union v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2394, 2395 (D.D.C.
1978).
50. It is interesting to note that although "status quo injunctions" have consistently
been associated with enjoining employers from conduct violative of their collective bar-
gaining agreements, section 301 injunctions against unions are also of a status quo nature
because they prohibit the unions from striking and forcing management to concede to
changes prior to arbitration.
51. See Note, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration - From M-K-T to Greyhound
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injunctions against employers, however, are rarely issued because of the
inability of the unions to satisfy the stringent "in aid of arbitration"
requirement. Few employer actions actually "frustrate(s) the arbitral
process or deprive(s) the union of an otherwise effective arbitral rem-
edy,"5 2 because unions usually can obtain an adequate remedy in
arbitration.
Employers generally do not promise to preserve the status quo in
their collective bargaining agreements. Rather, employers only promise
to submit to grievance and arbitration proceedings for resolving their
labor disputes. The unions, on the other hand, promise not to strike in
exchange for the employers' promise to submit to arbitration. 3 Thus,
unlike injunctions against employee strikes "where the implication of a
duty not to strike may be 'essential to carry out promises to arbitrate,'''1
4
there ordinarily will be no need to infer a duty on an employer to
preserve the status quo in order to protect arbitration." Notwithstanding
the strict standard applied by the courts, a line of cases has held in
favor of injunctive relief against employers where the unions have made
a sufficient showing that the injunction was "in aid of arbitration. 5 6
C. In Aid of Arbitration and Irreparable Harm-An Illusory Distinction
In granting a motion for a section 301 injunction, courts require a
showing that the traditional equitable considerations5 7 and the "in aid
of arbitration" requirement" have been satisfied. Examination of judicial
application of the section 301 standard reveals that many courts are
blurring together the equitable consideration of irreparable harm59 and
the "in aid of arbitration" requirement. Some courts expressly, and
others implicitly, have defined irreparable harm in terms of a finding
of frustration of arbitration.60 In Local Lodge, No. 1266 v. Panoramic
and Beyond, 3 IND. REL. L.J. 169 (1979) for a sinilar definition of status quo injunctions
which the author labels "status quo orders."
52. Local Lodge No. 1266, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1981).
53. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 247-48
(1970) ("As we have previously indicated, a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is
the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to
the process of arbitration.").
54. Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d
1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1977) (Greyhound II).
55. Id.
56. See supra note 47 for cases where courts have issued injunctions against employers.
57. See supra note 5 for the traditional equity test for determining the propriety of
injunctive relief.
58. See supra note 6 for definition of the phrase "in aid of arbitration."
59. See supra note 12 for definition of irreparable harm.
60. The district court in American Postal Workers recognized the relatedness of
irreparable injury and frustration of arbitration when it stated:
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Corp.,61 the Seventh Circuit described this interrelationship as the "twin
ideas" of irreparable harm and frustration of arbitration. 62 The court
explained that "[a]n injunction in aid of arbitration is appropriate,
therefore, only when the actual or threatened harm to the aggrieved
party amounts to a frustration or vitiation of arbitration. '6 3 Thus, em-
ployees suffering irreparable harm pending arbitration of a labor dispute
will not be protected by issuance of an injunction unless the union can
show that the harm threatened is so egregious that it frustrates the
arbitration process. Consequently, as applied by many courts, the concept
of irreparable harm has no independent significance from that of frus-
tration of arbitration.
The irreparable harm and "in aid of arbitration" prerequisites have
been satisfied in only a limited number of cases. 64 A review of the
decisions granting injunctive relief indicates that permanent job loss
caused by drastic employer action is the only situation in which the
courts have found irreparable injury amounting to a frustration of
arbitration. 65 Employer conduct that has been held sufficiently egregious
as to result in job loss, and thereby constituting a frustration of arbi-
tration, has included plant relocation, 66 termination of business,67 sub-
contracting union work,68 and partial liquidation of assets. 69
Although money damages were available to the employees in these
cases in the event that the arbitrator found in favor of the union, the
courts have consistently held money damages to be an inadequate remedy
for loss of employment. 70 In Columbia Typographical Union, No. 101
The inquiry into whether the arbitration would be frustrated by the failure to issue
an injunction is closely related to the question of whether the plaintiffs will suffer
an irreparable injury.
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp. 403, 408
(D. Conn. 1984), rev'd. 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
61. 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 286.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See supra note 47.
65. Note, Enjoining Employers Pending Arbitration-From M-K-T to Greyhound and
Beyond, 3 IND. REL. L.J. 169, 200-03 (1979). ("Other than plant relocations and shut-
downs which cause permanent job loss, there are probably no employer changes which
threaten to cause irreparable harm that will affect the arbitral process.").
66. Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d
115 (4th Cir. 1976).
67. Columbia Typographical Union No. 101 v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 100
L.R.R.M. 2394 (D.D.C. 1978).
68. Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 99 L.R.R.M. 2253 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).
69. Teamsters Local 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979).
70. Local Lodge No. 1226 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 286 (7th Cir. 1981).
("Where, as here, employer action threatens a permanent loss of jobs, a damage remedy
is inadequate."). See also Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
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v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,7 the Evening Star ceased publication
of its newspaper during the life of its collective bargaining agreement
with the union, allegedly in breach of a status quo clause in the contract.7 2
The D.C. Circuit issued a section 301 injunction preventing the Evening
Star from ceasing publication.73 The court explained that "[m]oney in
the bank does not fully compensate for the loss of a man or woman's
livehood [sic].""7
In Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,15
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court
decision enjoining an employer from unilaterally altering the work sched-
ules of its employees in violation of its collective bargaining agreement.
Amalgamated Transit demonstrates that courts are reluctant to find
irreparable harm amounting to frustration of arbitration unless job loss
is involved. The court reasoned that issuance of an injunction was
improper because the arbitrator could subsequently alter the pay sched-
ules if he or she determined that the company violated its agreement
with the union.76 Thus, the court explained "the situation can be restored
substantially to the status quo ante. '77
Lever Brothers Co. v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local
21778 is a prototypical case for illustrating the analysis used by the
courts in determining the propriety of status quo injunctions. In Lever
Brothers, the union sought to enjoin the relocation of the employer's
soap production operation from Maryland to Indiana until the employer
complied with the alleged contractual prerequisites to move.79 The court
found that the failure to issue an injunction would result in irreparable
harm. It stated:
Had the district court not preserved the status quo, Lever Brothers would
have permanently transferred their plant from Baltimore, Maryland, to
Hammond, Indiana. If the union then prevailed in the arbitration, they
would have had a double burden to satisfy-first, to convince the company
that it should not have moved the plant to Hammond, Indiana-a fait
Railroad Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960); Teamsters Local 71 v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc.,
582 F.2d 1336, 1341 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); Bakery Drivers
Local 802 v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 99 L.R.R.M. 2253, 2257 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Columbia
Typographical Union No. 101 v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 2394, 2396
(D.D.C. 1978); Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. National Tea Co.,
346 F. Supp. 875, 882-83 (W.D. Pa. 1972), remanded without opinion, 474 F.2d 1338
(3d Cir. 1972).
71. 100 L.R.R.M. 2394 (D.D.C. 1978).
72. Id. at 2395.
73. Id. at 2396.
74. Id.
75. 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977) (Greyhound II).
76. Id. at 1239.
77. Id.
78. 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 117.
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accompli, and then it would have had the burden to convince the company
to move the plant back to Baltimore, Maryland. The arbitration in this
sense would undoubtedly have been 'but an empty victory' for the union. 0
Thus, it appears that the distinction between irreparable harm and
the "in aid of arbitration" prerequisite in the section 301 standard is
illusory. The courts appear to be equating the concepts of "in aid of
arbitration," irreparable harm, and permanent job loss-and only the
satisfaction of this equation with its equivalent variables will provide a
successful claim for injunctive relief.
III. APPLICATION OF THE "IN AID OF ARBITRATION" TEST TO
AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS
A. The District Court and the Second Circuit's Application of the
Section 301 Standard
In American Postal Workers, the District Court for the District of
Connecticut was presented with the issue of whether to enjoin an
employer from discharging an employee pending arbitration of a wrongful
discharge claim, based on his first amendment right of free speech. The
district court applied the standard that had developed for issuing section
301 injunctions: the traditional equity considerations"' and a finding of
frustration of arbitration.82
Applying the traditional equitable standard for injunctive relief, the
district court found irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the
merits. 83 The court held that the possible chilling effect on the exercise
of the employees' first amendment rights to free speech resulting from
Danko's discharge constituted irreparable harm.84 The court based its
decision on case law authority that established that loss of first amend-
ment rights for even a short period constitutes irreparable harm85 and
"a plausible claim of a 'chilling effect' on the exercise of [first amend-
80. Id. at 122.
81. See supra note 5 for the traditional equity considerations.
82. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 408-09 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 407-08.
84. The district court judge stated:
I conclude that the plaintiffs have shown that the failure to enjoin Danko's discharge
would result in a chilling of his and the other employees' exercise of their first
amendment rights; thus, the plaintiffs have satisfied the irreparable harm requirement.
Id. at 408.
85. The district court articulated "[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Id. at 407 (quoting
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
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ment rights] meets the irreparable harm requirement."86 Following its
finding of irreparable harm and a brief discussion of the likelihood of
success on the merits, the court examined the question of whether failure
to issue an injunction would result in frustration of the arbitral process.
The court mechanically applied the section 301 analysis that had de-
veloped in the line of cases beginning with Boys Markets.87
In applying the section 301 standard, the court first recognized the
relatedness of the irreparable injury requirement and the "in aid of
arbitration" requirement. 8 It stated that it would need to determine if
the injury was sufficiently egregious that it would result in a frustration
of arbitration.8 9 The court summarily concluded that the arbitrator would
be unable to remedy the chilling effect of the employees' exercise of
their first amendment rights, and therefore, an injunction was necessary
to prevent a frustration of arbitration.90
The Second Circuit reversed the district court decision. It held that
Danko and the union failed to demonstrate sufficient injury to justify
a finding of irreparable harm.9' As a result, the court found no basis
to conclude that an injunction was necessary to aid the arbitral process. 92
The court reasoned that if the arbitrator found that Danko was dismissed
without cause, the arbitrator would have available the remedies of
reinstatement and full back pay.93 Thus, the arbitrator's ability to resolve
the issue and to fashion a remedy would not be frustrated.
B. The District Court's Extension of Status Quo Injunctions to Cover
First Amendment Claims... And Its Failure to Consider Arbitrability
of the Claim
Given the factual dissimilarity between American Postal Workers
94
and the cases in which the section 301 analysis has traditionally been
applied,95 the appropriateness of applying the section 301 standard
demands close scrunity. Prior to American Postal Workers, courts
exclusively granted injunctive relief in those cases in which permanent
86. Id. (quoting Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 1981)).
87. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
88. See supra note 60 for the courts discussion of the relatedness of irreparable injury
and frustration of arbitration.
89. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 408-09, rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
90. Id. at 409.
91. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 766 F.2d 715,
722 (2d Cir. 1985).
92. Id. at 723.
93. The Second Circuit explained, "[tihe dispute is currently the subject of arbitration,
and if Danko's discharge is ultimately deemed to have been without cause, he can be
reinstated with full pay, thereby returning to his former status with no difficulty." Id.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 7-13.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 64-80.
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job loss was threatened by drastic employer action (e.g., shut-down,
relocation). 96 Only in those limited situations did the courts find the
irreparable injury sufficient to satisfy the "in aid of arbitration" re-
quirement; for only under those extraordinary circumstances would the
arbitrator be unable or unwilling to remedy the harm caused by the
breaching party. The district court enlarged the scope of status quo
injunctions in American Postal Workers when it recognized that in-
junctive relief could be granted for violations of first amendment rights.97
At first blush, one might commend the district court for extending
the use of injunctions to a finding of irreparable harm based on a first
amendment violation. On closer scrutiny, however, it appears that the
district court may have incorrectly applied the section 301 standard by
failing to consider the section 301 prerequisite of arbitrability of the
claim.98 The district court found that the "in aid of arbitration" re-
quirement was satisfied because the arbitrator would be unable to provide
an appropriate remedy to Danko and the union for infringing upon their
first amendment rights.99 The court's argument (although not expressly
stated) was that if the discharge was effectuated, there would be a
chilling effect on the employees' first amendment rights and the only
remedy available to the employees in arbitration would be monetary
damages. The district court found such damages to be inadequate relief-
just as monetary damages had been held inadequate relief when per-
manent job loss was threatened by employer actions.
Although this is a very appealing argument because it provides
protection of first amendment rights, the court carelessly applied the
section 301 analysis when it failed to consider the Buffalo Forge
precondition of arbitrability.100 If the first amendment claim is nonar-
bitrable, a section 301 injunction cannot be obtained. Assuming arguendo
that the first amendment claim was nonarbitrable in this case, a section
301 claim could not have been made and injunctive relief would have
been denied because of the invocation of the anti-injunction provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 0' The court's analysis suffers from two
major defects: (1) it assumes arbitrability of the first amendment claim
because of the undisputed arbitrability of the wrongful discharge claim; 0 2
and (2) it fails to recognize that the plaintiffs' claim was based on a
96. See supra text accompanying notes 64-80.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 81-90.
98. The section 301 precondition of arbitrability was first recognized in Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United States Steelworkers. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
99. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 409 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46 for discussion of the Buffalo Forge
precondition of arbitrability.
101. See supra note 27 for the preamble of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 104-21.
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public right, the first amendment right of free speech, that mandates
a standard of review accorded to all constitutional claims. 103
C. Arbitrability of the First Amendment Claim
The arbitrability of the first amendment claim in American Postal
Workers is questionable. In general, an arbitrator has the authority to
remedy those matters within the purview of the contract. 104 This definition
of arbitral authority, however, offers little assistance in determining
whether a particular dispute is arbitrable because most courts will
broadly construe the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 105 A
liberal construction of labor agreements translates into granting extensive
powers to arbitrators. The underlying reason for the court's broad
interpretation of labor contracts (so as to relegate almost all labor
disputes to arbitration) is the courts' attempt to effectuate the federal
policy of encouraging peaceful resolution of labor disputes through
grievance and arbitration procedures. 10
6
In the Steelworkers Trilogy'017 cases, the Supreme Court exalted the
role of the arbitrator to an unprecedented level. 10 8 In United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,109 the Court stated that
"[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."110
Despite the Court's general deference to arbitral authority, the Court
has repeatedly stated that an arbitrator's authority is not without limits."'
103. See infra text accompanying notes 123-61.
104. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960) ("[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement."). See generally F. ELKOURI AND E. ASPER ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS, 169-80 (1973).
105. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960) ("An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers that asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage.").
106. Id.
107. The Steelworkers Trilogy refers to the following three cases: United Steelworkers
of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
108. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 551-56 (1976).
109. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
110. Id. at 582.
111. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) ("If an arbitral
decision is based 'solely upon the arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation,'
rather than on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator has
'exceeded the scope of the submission,' and the award will not be enforced.") (quoting
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An arbitrator has the power to decide only those issues that the parties
have agreed by contract to submit to arbitration.' 2 In order to ascertain
the intent of the parties, the courts most often refer to the language
of the contract, 1 3 and the common practices of the industry."
l 4
In American Postal Workers, the collective bargaining agreement
did not contain an explicit provision consigning to arbitration disputes
involving employees' freedom of speech."15 The fact that the first amend-
ment claim arose out of a dispute consigned to arbitration (Danko's
wrongful discharge claim) does not necessarily imply that the parties
intended all disputes, relating to or arising out of wrongful discharge
claims, be resolved by arbitration. Although the courts broadly construe
labor contracts,"16 it is highly unlikely that the employees, when nego-
tiating their contract, intended to have an arbitrator decide their con-
stitutional right of free speech.
Three reasons support this conclusion. First, collective bargaining
agreements seldom include provisions guaranteeing employees' rights
duplicative of constitutional rights.' 1 7 Second, the plaintiffs did not seek
injunctive relief from an arbitrator, nor did they seek resolution of their
first amendment claim through the grievance and arbitration procedures
established in their collective bargaining agreement." 8 Finally, the em-
from United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960)). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 588-92, 593-98 (1976).
112. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960) ("For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.").
113. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) ("As the proctor of
the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of
authority is the collective bargaining agreement and he must interpret and apply the
agreement in accordance with the 'industrial common law of the shop' and the various
needs and desires of the parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to
invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the parties.") (quoting in part
from United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960)).
114. See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
115. Although the opinion did not explicitly state that the collective bargaining
agreement did not contain a provision consigning to arbitration disputes over the employees'
free speech, it shall be inferred that the court's silence on this point implies that no such
provision was present. If there was such a provision the court certainly would have
mentioned it in its analysis whether an injunction was necessary to preserve the arbitral
process. The court only mentioned the fact that the wrongful discharge claim was subject
to arbitration. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F.
Supp. 403, 406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
117. See, e.g., Selected Constraints in Text 1 Lab. Re. Rep. (BNA) § 20:i (1986).
This reporter contains numerous collective bargaining agreements adopted by parties in
various industries. None of the agreements, even those directed to employment in the
public sector, included provisions providing rights to employees duplicative of constitutional
first amendment rights.
118. The opinion made no mention of the plaintiffs having commenced grievance and
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
ployees sought injunctive relief from the district court on a constitutional
claim of free speech and not on a contractual right to free speech." 9
Finding the employees' freedom of speech claim to be an arbitrable
issue would require construing the labor contract beyond its reasonable
limits.
Given the strong likelihood that the first amendment claim was
nonarbitrable, the district court erred in its application of the section
301 standard of analysis because the essential precondition of arbitrability
would not have been satisfied. 20 Consequently, by relying solely on
labor law and policy for protecting the plaintiffs' right to free speech,
the courts probably would have been forced to deny injunctive relief
because of the application of the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction pro-
visions. 21 However, the plaintiffs had a right to seek injunctive relief
on an alternative claim-a first amendment 22 constitutional claim of
free speech. 123
IV. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE RIGHTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT SETTING
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and Its Progeny
In the landmark decision of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,124 the
Supreme Court held that the prior submission to arbitration of a
contractual right that is duplicative of a statutory right does not preclude
an employee from obtaining a trial de novo under the statute. 125 In that
case, a black employee was allegedly discharged for producing too many
defective parts. 126 The employee claimed the discharge was racially
motivated.'27 Pursuant to an anti-discrimination provision in his collective
bargaining contract, the employee grieved and arbitrated his wrongful
discharge claim on the grounds of discrimination. 28 After having been
defeated in the grievance and arbitration proceedings, the employee
arbitration procedures on the issue of a chilling effect on their right to free speech. The
court only states that arbitration proceedings had commenced on the wrongful discharge
claim. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 406 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
119. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 595 F. Supp.
403, 406 (D. Conn. 1984) ("But the plaintiffs contend that Danko's discharge will have
a chilling effect on his and the other employees' exercise of theirfirst amendment rights.")
(emphasis added), rev'd, 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
121. See supra note 27 for the preamble of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
122. See supra note 2 for a restatement of the first amendment of the Constitution.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 124-61.
124. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
125. Id. at 51-54.
126. Id. at 38.
127. Curiously, the employee did not raise the racial discrimination claim until the
final pre-arbitration step. Id. at 42.
128. Id. at 39.
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filed a Title VII action 29 in federal district court. The district court
granted summary judgment' 3 for the former employer and the court
of appeals affirmed.' 3' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title
VII rights cannot be waived and that an employee has the right to a
judicial proceeding regardless of a prior arbitral decision on contractual
rights duplicative of Title VII rights. 32
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Court drew a distinction
between the public rights of an employee conferred by statute or the
Constitution and the private rights of an employee established in a
collective bargaining agreement. 33 The Court explained:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate
his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast,
in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent
statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of
these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both
were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly
no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in
their respectively appropriate forums.134
The Court distinguishes public rights from private rights because of its
belief that the public rights should be resolved in the courtroom rather
than in arbitration. 35
The Court proffers several reasons why judicial resolution of statutory
and constitutional rights is preferable over arbitral resolution of these
rights. 36 First, the arbitrator has a specialized expertise and is called
upon to decide the "law of the shop," not the "law of the land."'
' 7
129. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h (1982)). Section 703 of Title VII
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-() to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
130. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
131. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972).
132. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-54 (1974).
133. Id. at 49-50.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 57. ("[T]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary
responsibility of courts, and judicial construction...") (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 53-58. See also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
137. Id. at 57.
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This expertise is limited to issies concerning the "demands and harms
of industrial relations."' 3 Also, the arbitrator's authority derives solely
from the contract and, therefore, he or she may not have the power to
enforce statutory or constitutional rights. 3 9 Finally, arbitral factfinding
generally is not the equivalent of judicial factfinding.14'
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. does not prohibit the inclusion of
collective bargaining agreements that provide protection of rights already
protected by statute or under the Constitution.' 4' However, the arbitral
resolution of contractual claims will not result in a final and binding
decision. 42
In two cases following Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,143 the Court
echoed the legal principles and policy considerations of providing em-
ployees a judicial forum for adjudicating statutory or constitutional
claims. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,' 44 a group of
truckdrivers sought compensation for unpaid labor. 45 The employee
truckdrivers submitted their wage claims to a grievance committee
pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement. 46 The committee
rejected the employees' wage claims without explanation, 47 and the
employees subsequently filed suit in federal court for compensation
under section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 48 The district court
138. Id.
139. Id. at 53.
140. Id. at 57-58.
141. See id. at 59-60.
142. It is unclear what effect, if any, an arbitral award will have on the parties'
decision to pursue the contractual arbitration procedure, given that the courts will grant
a trial de novo subsequent to any arbitral award. However, the court apppars to hold
that if the contract consigns to arbitration a right duplicative of statutory rights, a party
will have both forums available. The Court states:
We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes
and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be
accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under
the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause
of action under Title VII.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
This district court for the District of Columbia in a case factually similar to American
Postal Workers (see infra note 161) stated that the arbitrator's "decision is not entitled
to any weight in adjudicating the present constitutional claim." American Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Service, 598 F. Supp. 564, (D.D.C. 1984).
143. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald
v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
144. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
145. Id. at 730.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 731.
148. Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1062 (1938) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 206(a). Section 6 of the Act provides in pertinent part, "[e]very employer shall
pay to each of his employees who in any work week is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, ... wages at the following rates ....
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and court of appeals refused to address the employees' wage claims
because of the prior submission of these claims to grievance and ar-
bitration proceedings.1
49
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions, holding that
the employees' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act were not
barred by the prior submission of their grievances to arbitration and
that the employees had the right to seek judicial relief for the statutory
violation. 150
The court in McDonald v. City of West Branch'5 ' also relied on
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.. This case is of particular importance
to the discussion of American Postal Workers because of its factual
similarity. 52 In McDonald, the plaintiff alleged he was discharged for
exercising his first amendment rights. 53 The plaintiff commenced griev-
ance and arbitration procedures pursuant to a provision in his collective
bargaining agreement requiring proper cause for employee discharge.
54
The plaintiff lost in arbitration, and subsequently filed a section 1983155
action seeking judicial relief for his statutory claim. 56 Employing the
reasoning used in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Court held that
individuals have the right to judicial resolution of their section 1983
claims, and that federal courts cannot apply res judicata or collateral
estoppel to an arbitral award.' 57
149. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 734 (1981).
150. Id. at 737. ("Not all disputes between an employee and his employer are suited
for binding resolution in accordance with the procedures established by collective bar-
gaining. While courts should defer to an arbitral decision where the employee's claim is
based on rights arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement, different considerations
apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to
provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.").
151. 104 S. Ct. 1799 (1984).
152. In both cases the plaintiffs alleged they were discharged for exercising their first
amendment right to free speech. In McDonald, however, the plaintiff brought the action
under § 1983 because the action was against city officials and the chief of police. Thus,
state action was involved. The plaintiffs in American Postal Workers were unable to
bring a § 1983 claim because there was no state action; the employer was the United
States Postal Service.
153. The plaintiff alleged he was discharged for exercising his first amendment rights
of "freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom to petition the government
for redress of grievances." McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1801
(1984).
154. Id.
155. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state ...subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured. . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
156. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1800 (1984).
157. Id. at 1803. ("[A]Ithough arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual
149
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B. Application of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. Analysis to Amer-
ican Postal Workers
In American Postal Workers, the plaintiffs improperly pled their
motion for injunctive relief by seeking a section 301 injunction to protect
their constitutional right to free speech. Their pleading was clearly
erroneous because section 301 only protects private rights secured under
collective bargaining agreements,I 8 not public rights conferred by statute
or guaranteed under the Constitution. The plaintiffs apparently failed
to recognize that they had two independent claims for relief: a consti-
tutional claim protecting their public right and a section 301 claim
protecting their private right.
Although it is questionable whether the plaintiffs actually had a
private right of free speech," 9 it is undeniable that plaintiffs had a
public, first amendment right. Under a constitutional claim, the plaintiffs
could have filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to protect their
right to free speech pending judicial resolution of their dispute. If the
plaintiffs had motioned for a preliminary injunction, the district court
would have applied the traditional equitable requirements for issuing
injunctive relief, 60 rather than the stringent "in aid of arbitration"
standard applied under section 301.
Had the plaintiffs recognized this alternative claim for injunctive
relief, it is doubtful that they would have sought injunctive relief solely
under section 301 because section 301 requires a showing of frustration
of arbitration. Under section 301 the plaintiffs' claim would have failed
if (1) the claim was nonarbitrable, (2) the injunction was not "in aid
of arbitration," or (3) the equitable considerations did not support
injunctive relief. Under the constitutional claim, the plaintiffs would
only have been required to satisfy the traditional equitable requirements.
The plaintiffs' failure to recognize and plead their alternative claim for
injunctive relief under the Constitution' had the potential of jeopard-
izing their ability to obtain an injunction to protect their first amendment
right of free speech.
disputes, our decisions in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver compel the conclusion that it
cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal
statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard. As a result,
according preclusive effect to an arbitration award in a subsequent § 1983 action would
undermine that statute's efficacy in protecting federal rights.").
158. See supra note 4 for the statutory language of section 301.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 104-19.
160. See supra note 5 for the traditional equitable requirements.
161. The plaintiffs' failure to plead their constitutional claim is especially perplexing
given that two months after the district court decision, the District Court for the District
of Columbia decided a factually similar case where the same union vindicated its con-
stitutional first amendment rights after having failed on a contractual right to relief.
American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 598 F. Supp.
564 (D.D.C. 1984) (not to be confused with case selected for discussion in this Case
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V. CONCLUSION
In American Postal Workers, the plaintiffs erroneously pled their
constitutional claim under section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act, and the district court and the court of appeals failed to
recognize or correct the plaintiffs' error. The employees should have
sought judicial relief under the Constitution for violation of their first
amendment right of free speech rather than seeking injunctive relief
under the labor laws.
Affording employees the opportunity to vindicate their statutory and
constitutional rights in a judicial forum, regardless of whether the
violation occurs in the employment setting or is subject to a collective
bargaining provision consigning the dispute to arbitration, comports with
the fundamental principle that private rights are subordinate to public
rights. This principle is not inconsistent with the federal policy of
encouraging peaceful resolutions of labor disputes through arbitration
because Congress intended "labor disputes" to include only those "con-
trovers[ies] concerning terms and conditions of employment."'' 62 Congress
promoted the use of arbitration because it was believed to be the best
method for resolving disputes in the employment setting given that an
arbitrator has specialized knowledge of the "demands and norms of
industrial relations."' 163 Congress did not intend that constitutional or
statutory rights be resolved by an arbitrator because these issues do not
fall within the arbitrator's specialized knowledge. Statutory and consti-
tutional issues are best resolved in a judicial forum, and Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver makes this forum available to employees whose statutory
or constitutional rights have been violated regardless of a prior arbitral
decision on a duplicative contract right.
Anastasia N. Markakis
Comment).
The dispute arose when an employee published an article in a union newspaper relaying
certain information that the employee stated was obtained through reading privileged
postal mail. The employee was discharged as a result of this conduct. The employee later
denied actually having read the mail and in a written retraction of the statement explained
that the reference was only made for purposes of dramatization. The arbitrator denied
relief under the contract.
The district court applied the Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. analysis and held that
the plaintiff had a claim for relief under the Constitution in addition to any contractual
claim that the employee may have had. The court stated that the arbitral decision "is
not entitled to any weight in adjudicating the present constitutional claim." Id. at 568.
162. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 113(c)
defines labor dispute as follows:
(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
163. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974).
152
